Theory 2 Action Podcast
Theory 2 Action Podcast
MM#429--80 Years Later...The Hard Truths of 1945: How the Atomic Bombs Prevented Greater Tragedy
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The darkest moments of history often involve impossible choices between terrible options. Such was the case in August 1945, when President Harry Truman authorized the use of atomic weapons to end World War II. In this compelling episode, we examine Richard B. Frank's definitive account "Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire" to understand why those bombs, despite their horrific toll, likely saved millions of lives.
What makes this historical moment so powerful is the stark mathematics behind the decision. By summer 1945, Japan's strategic situation was hopeless, yet their commitment to fight remained absolute. American intelligence revealed 4 million Japanese troops still under arms, with 900,000 defenders fortifying Kyushu exactly where Americans planned to land. Their "Operation Ketsu-Go" included 540 midget submarines, 3,000 suicide boats, 4,000 underwater frogmen, and waves of kamikazes – all designed to inflict such devastating American casualties that the U.S. would accept a negotiated peace rather than unconditional surrender.
The alternatives to atomic weapons were grim. Conventional bombing had already killed 300,000 Japanese civilians and destroyed 66 cities without prompting surrender. A naval blockade would cause millions to starve slowly. The planned invasion, Operation Downfall, projected 500,000 to 4 million American casualties and 5-10 million Japanese deaths. Even after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which together killed approximately 214,000 people, Japan's War Council remained deadlocked until Emperor Hirohito personally intervened.
This episode challenges us to consider how we judge difficult historical decisions without knowing all the facts. As Frank concludes: "American goals were simply not victory but peace... Had American leaders in 1945 been assured that Japan and the United States would pass two generations in tranquility... they would have believed their hard choices had been vindicated, and so should we." Join us as we explore this pivotal moment that reminds us why understanding history's hardest choices matters for our world today.
Key Points from the Episode:
• After David's father's accident and recovery, the podcast is returning to its previous format
• The "patriotic orthodoxy" that emerged after WWII holds that atomic bombs not only caused Japanese surrender but prevented horrific invasion casualties
• Critics argue Japan was already defeated and seeking surrender, or that alternatives like a demonstration bombing would have sufficed
• American intelligence revealed 4 million Japanese troops under arms, with 900,000 defenders on Kyushu and 12,000 aircraft converted for kamikaze attacks
• Japan's "Operation Ketsu-Go" strategy focused on inflicting maximum American casualties to force a negotiated peace
• Conventional bombing had already killed 300,000 Japanese civilians and destroyed 66 cities without prompting surrender
• Atomic bombs killed approximately 214,000 people by December 1945 – a tragedy, but far fewer than the 5-10 million Japanese casualties projected from invasion
• The Japanese Supreme War Council remained deadlocked even after both bombs, requiring Emperor Hirohito's personal intervention
• History shows Truman faced only bad options, and chose the one that would end the war with the fewest deaths
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Despite our best efforts to maintain our new schedule, we've made the decision to scale back our workload for now due to personal and professional commitments. The good news is that the podcast isn't going anywhere. We'll be returning to our previous format, which we feel best supports both the show and our community. Thank you for your understanding and continued support. We're excited to keep bringing you meaningful books and conservative and Catholic content, just in a more sustainable way. Again, thank you for your understanding and support. Now enjoy the new show.
Speaker 2:Welcome to the Theory to Action podcast, where we examine the timeless treasures of wisdom from the great books in less time, to help you take action immediately and ultimately to create and lead a flourishing life. Now here's your host, David Kaiser.
Speaker 3:Hello, I am David, and welcome back to another Mojo Minute and a very good welcome back to this microphone. As some of you may know, my dad fell and broke his hip last week, so I had to take some time off to visit him in the hospital, and he's doing much better now and recovering, which is a huge relief. And he's doing much better now in recovering, which is a huge relief. When it happened, though, I was actually three hours away giving a big presentation for a major client in my main job, so things got very, very hectic, and I just want to say how much I appreciate all the well wishes and prayers for my family. It really means a lot. Many of you have reached out personally, and I appreciate that greatly. As you may have heard from our formal announcement in the beginning of the show, with everything going on in my personal and professional life, we are switching back to the old format of the show. It's a more sustainable way to keep things running and still deliver the content that you love and to serve you. For now, this seems and feels like the best approach. Until life slows down a bit, my commitments shift, but don't worry, we are already brainstorming some creative ways to bring you more wisdom and less time. So stay tuned, because there's definitely more to come on that front. But for today though, let's dive in and grab our first pull quote from our book of the day. Go on to the book.
Speaker 3:The Pacific War ended in September 1945. Amid shattering cities, the Japanese people faced lean years beyond their imagining Occupation. Authorities under MacArthur treated Japan's surrender as indeed unconditional and moved briskly to extinguish imperial Japan. They recognized no guarantee to preserve the imperial institution, much less the incumbent beyond the promise in the Potsdam Declaration that the Japanese people would be free to choose their form of government. For American leaders, the abrupt halt of the war delivered them from a double quandary. On the political level, they had been wrestling the contradictions of the public's insistence on complete victory with its fading stamina. Meanwhile, on the military level, the Japanese capitulation snuffed out an incipient confrontation over strategy ignited by ULTRA's revelations. The seemingly self-evident proposition that swiftly gained ascendancy in the United States was that the atomic bombs not only caused the Japanese surrender but also obviated the horrifying cost of an invasion. Opinion polls showed overwhelming support about 85% for the use of the bombs. The minuscule number of Americans who thought the bombs should not have been employed were outnumbered 6 to 1 in an October 1945 poll in which 23% of the respondents would have favored dropping more than two bombs. Millions of American servicemen believed that they personally had their lives spared by the bombs. This attitude, later labeled the patriotic orthodoxy by one of its critics, secured an invulnerable hold on the generation that fought the war, and that is a quote from chapter 20 of Richard B Frank's downfall, the end of the Imperial Japanese Empire.
Speaker 3:Now, who is Rich Frank? Well, he is, at least in the opinion of the majority of people who pay attention to the Pacific War of World War II, the Asia-Pacific War historian. He is the man. He has written numerous books, which are all universally treated as definitive accounts on their subjects, which include Guadalcanal, the definitive account of a landmark battle, and the book today that we're reviewing account of a landmark battle, and the book today that we're reviewing, downfall, the End of the Imperial Japanese Empire. His latest work, which is absolutely fantastic but which is very, very long, is Tower of Skulls the History of the Asia-Pacific War, volume 1, july 1937 to May 1942. War, volume 1, july 1937 to May 1942. He's a widely acclaimed speaker, former US Army combat officer from Vietnam and a former National World War II museum collaborator and advisor.
Speaker 3:Now our key nugget of wisdom comes from our first quote, and that's that those who fought the war on the ground, those that saw fellow soldiers, airmen, marines and sailors die to their left and their right, those men and some women came home in 1945 and 46, fully convinced the dropping of the bombs were the best decisions on a menu of very bad options. None of them were good. Death was coming to many, many people, both Japanese and American. So this so-called patriotic orthodoxy sounds condescending from the critics. So we'll just say it was the facts on the ground, based on the very best intelligence, which, some 80 years later now, has proved itself out. The facts are still the facts, yes, but let's hear from these critics Going back to the book.
Speaker 3:Dissenting voices at first were few and faint, but over several decades a body of scholarship grew to assail this orthodoxy. The varied arguments of these critics had distilled into reoccurring themes. Japan was thoroughly defeated by August 1945, and her rulers understood this. Japanese leaders were actively moving towards surrender. American policymakers knew that a guarantee of the imperial system was essential in obtaining Japan's capitulation and that such a pledge would have ended the war without an invasion or atomic bombs.
Speaker 3:Other critics have complimented or supplanted these dominant themes with assertions that the conventional blockade or bombardment alone would have ultimately induced Japan's surrender as well. Induced Japan's surrender as well. Still, others have argued that at least a demonstration of the atomic weapons should have been attempted before they were used on cities. And the most provocative charge has been of some ulterior purpose in the use of the atomic weapons intimidating the Soviets, justifying the enormous expenditure of funds and satisfying perverse intellectual curiosity? Or perpetuating the Manhattan Project as a bureaucratic empire. This barrage of challenges seeped into the public discourse, aided by growing public cynicism since the 1960s. By November 1994, one poll disclosed that the majority of Americans favoring the use of atomic bombs had slipped to 55%, while those opposed swelled from 4% to 39%. With these broad numbers, there were sharp divisions, with 72% of men in favor and 53% of women against. This was another schism. Or there was another schism by age groups, with the 18 to 44-year-old groups group split almost evenly 48% pro, 46% anti, while those 45% and above remained strongly supportive 64% pro and 31% anti.
Speaker 3:These debates over the end of the war in the Pacific intermingled arguments about the course of actual events with suppositions. And here's where Richard Franks' book is absolutely definitive across all suppositions. He goes on later. This chapter begins to address these alternatives and issues. Alternatives and issues, I'm sorry. This chapter begins to address these issues by disentangling the essential factual realities from the speculative alternatives. And so, since we just passed our 80th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, japan, to end the Pacific War, of World War II, I thought it's best that we address these head on and get to the facts. And we're getting to the facts with Rich Frank's definitive account.
Speaker 3:But let's set the stage before we go back to the book, to give some context, summer of 1945 presented President Harry Truman with one of history's most consequential decisions. As Japan refused to surrender despite facing inevitable defeat, american planers prepared for Operation Downfall, which would have been the largest amphibious invasion in military history, dwarfing even D-Day. But instead, on August 6th and August 9th, two atomic bombs ended World War II in a matter of days. The evidence strongly suggests these bombings, while devastating, prevented an even greater catastrophe that would have claimed millions of more lives on both sides. So here's the context.
Speaker 3:By July 1945, japan's strategic situation was hopeless, but their willingness to fight remained absolute. And here's what American intelligence revealed. This is what we just learned from Ultra, from the book the secret code breaking mechanism. The key military facts were that 4 million Japanese troops were still under arms and over 2.3 million civilians were organized in the Civilian Volunteer Corps. Over 12,000 aircraft have been converted for kamikaze attacks. There was intensive fortification of the island of Kaushu with over 900,000 defenders. There was zero chance for victory, but there was a total commitment of an honorable death.
Speaker 3:The Japanese had correctly predicted exactly where the Americans would land those beaches of Kyushu and had tripled their defensive forces from one division in spring 1945 to over listen 15 divisions by August. Their strategy wasn't to win, but to inflict such massive casualties that America would accept a negotiated peace rather than unconditional surrender. Surrender, operation Ketsu Go or the Decisive Battle Plan. That was Japan's homeland defense strategy. It was designed simply around one principle kill as many Americans as possible, regardless of Japanese losses. The Japanese plan included 540 midget submarines for suicide attacks on transport ships, over 3,000 suicide boats targeting landing craft, 4,000 underwater suicide frogmen, massive kamikaze waves designed for 300 to 400 aircraft per hour. Until they were all gone, civilians armed with bamboo spears were being instructed on how to fight to the death. This wasn't desperate bravado. At Okinawa, japanese defenders had inflicted 35% casualties on American forces, and that was just one island. Kyushu's terrain was even more favorable for the defense.
Speaker 3:So President Truman faced four realistic options on his desk in August 1945. Option one to continue the conventional bombing. Realistic options on his desk in August 1945. Option one to continue the conventional bombing. The reality was it was devastating but very insufficient. The March 1945 Tokyo firebombing killed over 100,000 people in one night, actually more than either atomic bomb. Yet Japan didn't surrender in March. By August 1945, conventional bombing had killed over 300,000 Japanese civilians and destroyed some 66 cities. But Japan's military remained determined to fight.
Speaker 3:Option two was the naval blockade and siege. The problem is it could take years. While Japanese civilians starved. The American public was war-weary After four years of fighting. A continued blockade would likely kill more Japanese civilians than the atomic bombs through famine and disease.
Speaker 3:Option three was to demonstrate the bomb that we just heard about. Why was it rejected by President Truman? Because only two bombs actually existed. Wasting one on demonstration meant losing 50% of America's nuclear arsenal, meant losing 50% of America's nuclear arsenal. The risk of the bomb being a dud would only encourage Japanese resistance. Remember only one of the bombs was tested, japanese might shoot down the demonstration aircraft. In the meantime there was no guarantee that Japanese leaders would be convinced by a demonstration of a bomb. They had just watched over 300,000 of their own civilians die from March to August. Why would just a demonstration of a horrific bomb convince them to surrender? So option four was the toughest option but also the best option of a very clear bad set of options.
Speaker 3:Now, the human cost is certainly a tragedy, but it was a clear calculation. The atomic bomb casualties were going to be horrible but limited. Hiroshima approximately 80,000 immediately killed, over 140,000 by the end of 1945. So a total of around 214,000 deaths by December 1945. Now these numbers absolutely represent an incomprehensible human tragedy. Every person killed had a name, a family, hopes, dreams. Had a name, a family, hopes, dreams. The suffering immense, unbelievable. Immediate People vaporized instantly, others dying slowly from radiation sickness weeks later.
Speaker 3:But the invasion casualties estimate make clear why Truman chose the atomic option. The US military projections on the invasion the conservative estimate was over 500,000 to more than a million casualties would have happened. The War Department's estimate was 1.7 to almost north of 4 million American casualties. High-end estimate of American deaths alone was 400,000 to 800,000. Just in Kyushu. Phase 1 was going to be north of 175 American casual casualties, japanese military and civilian deaths. The low estimate from American planners was between 5 to 10 million deaths. The bombing would continue. High estimate was north of 10 million Civilian population on Kyushu alone, 2.4 million. They had no evacuation plans. Something that no one ever considers was the 15,000 American prisoners scheduled for execution upon the invasion.
Speaker 3:The math is stark but undeniable. Even using the most conservative invasion estimates, operation Downfall would have killed five to ten times more Americans than both atomic bombs combined and an astonishing 25 to 50 times more Japanese than both atomic bombs combined. Every Allied prisoner of war in Japanese custody would have been killed. This wasn't just speculation. American forces had just experienced 35% casualty rates on Okinawa alone against 100,000 Japanese defenders. Kyushu had 900,000 defenders in prepared positions, with civilians ordered to fight with bamboo spears and kitchen knives. So the timeline was that the atomic bombs just didn't kill people, but they broke the psychological will of Japanese leadership.
Speaker 3:The first bomb dropped on August 6th at Hiroshima. The Japanese Supreme War Council, upon hearing the news, remained deadlocked on a vote of three to three on surrendering. They remain deadlocked on a vote of three to three in the Japanese Supreme War Council on surrender. The next day, japanese foreign ministry orders an immediate destruction of all the diplomatic documents, a clear evidence that they anticipated defeat. Another thing that most people don't take into account that on August 8th, two days after the bombing of Hiroshima, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan, eliminating Japan's last hope for negotiated peace. With that war, councils still remained deadlocked at 3-3, two full days after Nagasaki was bombed in the second atomic bombing on Japan. And finally, emperor Hirohito personally broke the deadlock. For the first time in the war, he ordered acceptance of the surrender. It was only seven days, six days later, I'm sorry, six days later. It was only six days later, a long, very long six days later, that the emperor announced surrender to the Japanese people, the first time his voice was ever heard in broadcast.
Speaker 3:Again, the alternatives were far, far worse. Invasion meant genocide. Japanese propaganda in the summer of 45 literally called for 100 million deaths rather than surrender. Every civilian aged 15 to 60, men and 17 to 40 women were militarized. There was no evacuation plans for civilian areas militarized. There was no evacuation plans for civilian areas. All POWs were scheduled to be executed upon invasion. Suicide attacks by the entire population was expected and often demanded. Again, kyushu had nine times more defenders than Okinawa, in a better defensive terrain, with an entire civilian population mobilized for glorious death.
Speaker 3:Let's go back to our expert, rich Franks, on the precise casualty figures. All the emphasis on precise casualty factors, however, obscures the decisive question what casualties did American policymakers believe the American public would abide in order to achieve an enduring peace? The shrewder critics of Truman and Stimson have pointed out that the overall American losses for the war were about 1 million, including 290,000 more battle deaths. It is extremely difficult to believe that Truman and his advisors, already concerned about public morale in August 1945, would have embarked on any strategy that likely doubled that number. But what they perceive the upper limit of public tolerance to be must remain in the realm of conjecture. It is perhaps significant that General Marshall, who was keenly attuned to public morale, balked at pressing numbers over 100,000 for Olympic alone. For Olympic alone.
Speaker 3:Olympic was the next phase after the invasion of Kyushu. So General Marshall balked at pressing numbers over 100,000 for Olympic alone. To Truman, in any event, the Japanese buildup on Kyushu was sufficient to threaten to make the cost of the invasion unacceptable. Thus the Japanese were correct to believe that in a non-nuclear arena they could secure bargaining leverage to force a negotiated peace. But once American leaders learned of the odds facing Olympic, there was no prospect that any other consideration could have stayed the use of atomic weapons.
Speaker 3:And so the historical verdict is this the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were terrible. They were traumatic, but they were necessary. They ended the most destructive war in human history in the least destructive way available. Every other realistic alternative would have produced far more death and suffering. The 214,000 people who died in those atomic blasts paid the ultimate price to spare millions of others the same fate. Their sacrifice, involuntarily though it was, saved more lives than perhaps any single action in human history. It's the terrible mathematics of August 1945. And that's why, despite all the horror, all the tragedy, all the trauma, all the suffering, president Truman made the right choice. The Japanese people were not going to surrender without the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Speaker 3:Let's go back to Rich Franks for his final paragraph of the book. Finally, the deaths actually incurred in ending the war were not gratuitous. American goals were simply not victory but peace. American goals were simply not victory but peace. Had American leaders in 1945 been assured that Japan and the United States would pass two generations in tranquility and still look forward with no prospect of future conflict. They would have believed their hard choices had been vindicated, and so should we. So in today's Mojo Minute, let's talk about why reading history matters, because some of the toughest decisions made by our leaders turn out to be the best ones, even when all the options on the table were bad. We should read Richard Frank's definitive account of the Pacific War. In fact it's a must read. He doesn't sugarcoat the hard decisions, the hard choices our leaders had to make. Looking back now, some 80 years later, and judging those decisions without knowing all the facts, that's not fair and it misleads people and it misleads Americans about their own history and, honestly, that's a disservice to everyone, as always keep fighting the good fight.
Speaker 2:Thank you for joining us. We hope you enjoyed this Theory to Action podcast. Be sure to check out our show page at teammojoacademycom, where we have everything we discussed in this podcast, as well as other great resources. Until next time, keep getting your mojo on.